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Non-Technical Summary
Banking activities are regulated and supervised throughout the industrial countries.
In general, the reasons for this regulation and supervision are controversial. “A
central issue in this controversy is the extent to which a negative event, occurring at
a specific bank, that implies an increase in the probability of its failure, generates
negative externalities for the banking system.” (Slovin et al., 1999: 198) This is what
is often referred to as systemic risk in banking.
The analysis in this paper attempts to answer the question whether the threat of
systemic risk in banking is a national threat or rather a Europe-wide threat.
Following De Nicolo and Kwast (2001), mean rolling-window correlations between
bank stock returns are used as a measure for the interdependencies among European
banks, and hence for the systemic risk potential in Europe. 
At first, weekly rolling-window correlations are calculated between stock returns of
the 60 largest European banks without controlling for national factors. These give
evidence that interdependencies have increased within the last two decades.
However, since national factors determine to a large extent stock returns this result
can only be seen as preliminary.
Thus, in the second part of the analysis we estimate – on a monthly basis – a return
generating model in order to eliminate national influences from bank stock returns.
The national market returns and the European market return as well as the change in
national interest rates are used as the regressors. The unanticipated change in interest
rates is calculated using an ARIMA model. The return generating model is estimated
for every country in a panel with fixed effects using least squares. Based on the
residuals from these regressions the part of the bank stock returns that is not due to
national influence is calculated.
Thereafter, rolling-window correlations are calculated using the adjusted bank stock
returns. Again, we find evidence that interdependencies among European banks
have increased over the last 15 years. This indicates that the potential for systemic
risk at the European level has risen and that there may have been a shift in the
systemic risk potential from a national level to a European level.
The evidence on the rise in systemic risk potential found for Europe provides an
argument in favour of Europe-wide banking regulation and supervision. Whether the
existing forms of cooperation between the national authorities is an appropriate way
in securing financial stability or whether a single European supervisor is needed is
up to further research.
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Abstract
This paper attempts to answer the question whether the threat of systemic risk in
banking exists only on a national or on a European level. Following De Nicolo and
Kwast (2001), mean rolling-window correlations between bank stock returns are
used as a measure for interdependencies among European banks, and hence for the
systemic risk potential in Europe. National influences on stock returns are
eliminated by estimating a return generating model. There is some evidence that
interdependencies among European banks have increased over the past 15 years and
that the potential of systemic risk has shifted from a national level to a European
level.
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11 Motivation
Banking activities are regulated and supervised throughout the industrial
countries. In general, the reasons for this regulation and supervision are
controversial. “A central issue in this controversy is the extent to which a
negative event, occurring at a specific bank, that implies an increase in the
probability of its failure, generates negative externalities for the banking
system.” (Slovin et al., 1999: 198) This is what is often referred to as systemic
risk in banking.
In Europe banking regulation and in particular supervision is organised at a
national level. There is nothing such as a European Financial Services Authority
(FSA). However, there may be the need for such a single European banking
supervision authority since the threat of systemic risk may have shifted from the
national level to the European level.1 Integration of financial markets in Europe
has increased rapidly not just since the introduction of the Euro. This
development may have increased interdependencies among financial institutions
of different countries which in turn may have led to a rise in the potential of
cross-border contagion, i.e. systemic risk at a European level. If this is true a
bank failure in one country could potentially trigger further failures not only in
the same country but also in other countries. The danger of the current nation-
based system is that a national banking supervisor would possibly undervalue or
even disregard such a cross-border contagion effect. Thus, a single European
supervisor or at least strong coordination among national supervisors could be
needed.2
There are many theoretical studies on systemic risk in banking, however, hardly
any empirical work exists – at least not for Europe. In particular there are no
studies that focus on the trans-border aspect of systemic risk in banking and the
consequences for banking supervision in Europe. Closely related is the financial
crisis literature that looks at cross-border contagion, however, there the focus is
primarily on currency and debt crisis. This paper aims to assess the threat of
systemic risk in European banking. Following De Nicolo and Kwast (2001),
                                          
1 There are a number of different measures employed in order to contain systemic risk in
banking that are often part of banking supervision and regulation. The main measures are
lender of last resort, deposit insurance, disclosure requirements and capital regulation. See,
for example, Davis (1992), Bartholomew and Whalen (1995), Kaufman and Scott (2000),
Canoy et al. (2001).
2 The question that arises is whether the potential of systemic risk may be even world-wide
and not just Europe-wide. The analysis in this paper is motivated from banking supervision
that – at least in the short and medium run – will not be organised at a world-wide level.
Thus, we merely analyse the potential of systemic risk at the European level and do not ask
whether there may be also contagion between European and non-European banks.
2rolling-window correlations among bank stock returns are used as an indication
for the development of interdependencies among banks over time and hence for
the systemic risk potential. Beforehand, national factors determining bank stock
returns are eliminated by estimating a return generating model.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 defines systemic risk and gives a
brief review of the (empirical) literature. Section 3 attempts to assess the
systemic risk potential in Europe. Section 3.1 gives some first insights using
descriptive methods. Sections 3.2-3.6 describe our correlation analysis both with
and without controlling for national factors determining bank stock returns.
Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 Systemic risk
2.1 What is systemic risk?
No uniform definition of systemic risk exists in the literature. Loosely speaking,
systemic risk means “the risk or probability of breakdowns in an entire system,
as opposed to breakdowns in individual parts or components” (Kaufman and
Scott, 2000: 1). Beyond dispute is that systemic risk can occur in banking as
well as in other parts of the financial sector, e.g. in payment and settlement
systems or in securities markets – in financial markets in general. Furthermore,
there is consensus on the existence of different channels through which systemic
risk can occur in banking. Instead of giving a comprehensive definition of
systemic risk these different channels are discussed in order to explain the
concept of systemic risk in banking.3 
There are two ways in which systemic risk can occur in the banking market
(Staub, 1999). First, a macro shock can simultaneously have averse effects on
several banks. Such a macro shock can either be a cyclical downturn or other
aggregate shocks like interest rate or exchange rate shocks or a stock market
crash. 
Second, systemic risk can occur as a result of contagion in the banking market,
i.e. an initial shock causes one bank to fail which subsequently leads to the
failure of other banks (“micro channel”). Such contagion in banking can work
through two channels (de Bandt and Hartmann, 2000): the exposure channel and
the information channel. The former results from real exposures in the interbank
market and/or in payment systems. Thus, insolvency problems of one bank can
                                          
3 The definitions for systemic risk given so far all refer to one or more parts of this whole
concept of systemic risk. For a comprehensive definition of systemic risk see de Bandt and
Hartmann (2000).
3trigger a chain reaction leading to other bank failures. This channel refers to the
so called “domino effect”. The information channel, in contrast, refers to ways
through which bad news from one bank lead to the conclusion in the market that
other banks are also in trouble. This will lead to adjustments of contracts with
other partners or – on the depositor level – to contagious withdrawals (bank
runs). A central concept of this channel is that depositors and also other
counterparties have only imperfect information about (a) the type of shocks
hitting a bank, i.e. whether it is idiosyncratic or systemic and (b) the real
exposures to other banks.
In this paper the focus is on the micro channel of systemic risk. Thus, in the
context of this paper a macroeconomic shock that causes several banks to fail is
not regarded as systemic risk. As a consequence the terms systemic risk and
contagion risk are used interchangeably. This view is in line with the definitions
of systemic risk given, for example, by Kaufman (1995)4 or the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS).
In general the banking or the financial sector is viewed as more vulnerable to
contagion than other industries since banks are viewed as more susceptible to
failures (Kaufman 1995, 1996, Goodhart et al., 1998, de Bandt and Hartmann,
2000). In this sense, banks are special for several reasons: 
One reasons lies in the structure of the banks. Banks are vulnerable to runs due
to fractional reserve banking, i.e. in the case of high withdrawals the banks may
not be able to fulfil deposit obligations. Furthermore, banks are highly
leveraged, i.e. they have a low capital-to-assets ratio. Thus there is only little
room for losses. In addition, they exhibit low cash-to-assets ratios which may
require the sale of earning assets to meet deposit obligations. Furthermore banks
are highly interconnected through direct exposures in the interbank money
market, the large-value payment and security settlement systems.
2.2 Review of literature
There is a wide theoretical literature on systemic risk starting from the classical
bank run models following Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and extensions of these
models of single banks’ fragility to models of multiple bank systems, leading to
the modern bank contagion literature.5
                                          
4 Kaufman (1995: 47) defines systemic or contagion risk as “the probability that cumulative
losses will occur from an event that sets in motion a series of successive losses along a
chain of institutions or markets comprising a system.”
5 For a good survey on the theoretical as well as the empirical literature on systemic risk see
de Bandt and Hartmann (2000).
4Also, there are empirical studies on systemic risk and contagion in the banking
sector that utilise several different approaches. The predominant part of these
studies examine specific bank failures of the past either by looking at
intertemporal correlations of bank failures or by doing event studies.6 Since
today – i.e. in times of deposit insurance’s and lenders of last resort – bank runs
and accumulated bank failures do not actually occur in industrial countries such
methods can not be applied in order to empirically examine systemic risk. Also
the use of historical data – for example from the free banking era in the United
States – is not appropriate when assessing the actual threat of systemic risk and
contagion in banking. Hence, an indicator for the potential of systemic risk is
needed.
Focusing exclusively on the potential threat stemming from interbank lending,
i.e. on the exposure channel of systemic risk one approach is to directly examine
exposures in the interbank market and simulate contagious effects following the
hypothetical failure of one bank. There are some studies for the US that use this
approach utilising data, for example, from the Federal Reserve’s large-value
transfer system, Fedwire, or the Clearinghouse Interbank Payments System
(CHIPS) (Kaufman, 1994, Humphrey, 1986, Furfine, 1999). For Europe,
Michael (1998), reports some exposures from London interbank markets,
Angelini et al. (1996) from the Italian netting system, and Sheldon and Maurer
(1998) base their simulations on accounting data drawn from banks that operate
in Switzerland. All of these studies report a relatively small threat to financial
market stability from the failure of one bank.
Unfortunately, for whole Europe data on interbank lending is only available on
an aggregate level which does not allow for statements concerning contagion
risk between individual banks. Nevertheless, such an analysis on an aggregate
basis is made in section 3.1 in order to gain a first insight.
Contrary to former studies this study attempts to assess the threat of systemic
risk in banking in an international context.7 In particular, this paper attempts to
answer the question whether systemic risk in Europe can be regarded as a
country specific threat – or if it should rather be regarded as a Europe-wide
threat. To answer this question is of crucial importance for banking regulation
and supervision. We attempt to answer this question using correlations among
bank stock returns as a measure for the interdependencies – and hence the
potential for systemic risk among banks. Before correlations are calculated a
                                          
6 See, for example, Aharony and Swary (1983), Swary (1986), Schoenmaker (1996), Slovin et
al. (1999), Bessler and Nohel (2000), Akhigbe and Madura (2001).
7 Of course there is the financial crisis literature that looks at cross-border contagion (see, e.g.,
Dornbusch et al., 2000). But their focus is primarily on currency or debt crisis.
5return generating model is estimated in order to control for national factors
determining bank stock returns. 
3 The threat of systemic risk in European banking
3.1 Some insights from cross-border banking
When focusing on the exposure channel of systemic risk the claims and
liabilities among banks in the interbank market give evidence on the systemic
risk potential. Unfortunately, such data is not available on a bank-to-bank basis
at the European level. However, the BIS International Banking Statistics
contains aggregate data on the international claims of reporting banks on
individual countries.8 Table 1 shows a matrix containing these claims as a
percentage of total assets of Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI’s)9 (as of end
June 2001). Claims vis-à-vis one country above 5 % are indicated by grey
highlighting.
                                          
8 Bank for International Settlement, Quarterly reviews, Table 9B.
9 The definition of MFI’s conforms to that of reporting banks by the BIS.
6Table 1 – Consolidated international claims of reporting banks on individual countries as a percentage of total assets of MFI’s
 (amounts outstanding as of End June 2001)
Country A
Country B AT BE DK FI FR DE IE IT NL PT ES SE CH UK Total
AT 0.00741 0.00065 0.00033 0.01141 0.12966 0.00076 0.00678 0.00873 0.00050 0.00298 0.00156 0.01106 0.01491 0.19673
BE 0.00099 0.00165 0.00015 0.04568 0.05873 0.00082 0.01420 0.03211 0.00036 0.00936 0.00331 0.01884 0.01733 0.20353
DK 0.00136 0.00950 0.02008 0.00640 0.05239 0.00169 0.00249 0.01771 0.00019 0.00195 0.01850 0.00978 0.01463 0.15667
FI 0.00253 0.01109 0.04283 0.02202 0.09473 0.00222 0.00348 0.01193 0.00028 0.00525 0.06235 0.00871 0.01912 0.28653
FR 0.00039 0.00909 0.00027 0.00008 0.02805 0.00036 0.00625 0.00565 0.00053 0.00310 0.00062 0.00608 0.01072 0.07119
DE 0.00251 0.00593 0.00080 0.00038 0.01260 0.00069 0.00347 0.00763 0.00030 0.00292 0.00125 0.00772 0.00794 0.05416
GR 0.00331 0.01963 0.00037 0.00102 0.05461 0.10463 0.00000 0.01073 0.02589 0.00206 0.01180 0.00108 0.01264 0.02420 0.27196
IE 0.00430 0.02808 0.00083 0.00057 0.02122 0.08507 0.01023 0.00988 0.00152 0.00380 0.00274 0.00764 0.03434 0.21021
IT 0.00173 0.02258 0.00006 0.00053 0.03841 0.06692 0.00104 0.02039 0.00052 0.00626 0.00088 0.01366 0.02306 0.19603
LU 0.00227 0.01866 0.00590 0.00016 0.02259 0.12717 0.00028 0.03221 0.00836 0.00199 0.00320 0.00186 0.01244 0.01032 0.24743
NL 0.00178 0.02477 0.00102 0.00021 0.03072 0.07058 0.00098 0.00975 0.00090 0.00698 0.00214 0.01233 0.02342 0.18557
NO 0.00092 0.00492 0.00842 0.00676 0.00678 0.03998 0.00047 0.00192 0.00871 0.00014 0.00085 0.01858 0.00661 0.01446 0.11952
PT 0.00110 0.01148 0.00066 0.00051 0.01347 0.05345 0.00000 0.02638 0.01005 0.01483 0.00071 0.00343 0.01522 0.15129
ES 0.00026 0.00857 0.00035 0.00012 0.02070 0.04243 0.00083 0.00550 0.00663 0.00288 0.00022 0.00526 0.00945 0.10320
CH 0.00129 0.00510 0.00084 0.00010 0.01879 0.03483 0.00013 0.00262 0.00592 0.00063 0.00133 0.00097 0.00745 0.08000
UK 0.00156 0.01427 0.00311 0.00067 0.02099 0.06485 0.00549 0.00833 0.01798 0.00109 0.00657 0.00430 0.03001 0.17924
Reports cross-border claims of banks in country B vis-à-vis country A as a percentage of total assets of MFI’s in country B
Source: Bank for International Settlement, ECB, own calculations; Note: AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, DK = Denmark, FI = Finland, FR = France, DE =
Germany, GR = Greece, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, LU = Luxembourg, NL = The Netherlands, NO = Norway, PT = Portugal, ES = Spain, SE = Sweden,
CH = Switzerland, UK = United Kingdom; Claims vis-à-vis one country above 5 % are indicated by grey highlighting.
7The figures in table 1 indicate that international bank lending takes only a very small
portion of total assets. For almost all countries international claims do not exceed 5
% – often not even 1 % of total MFI assets. Only vis-à-vis Germany some countries
have international claims of above 5 %. These figures do not give evidence for
substantial international bank lending relative to total assets.
However, the significance of these figures for systemic risk should not be
overestimated. The figures contain international claims on individual countries, i.e.
not just on banks in that country but also on government and private households.
Furthermore, these figures do not tell us anything about the bank-to-bank exposures
that are one main channel for contagion in banking. Thus, despite the low
interdependencies on the aggregate level there may be substantial interbank lending
on a bank-to-bank basis which causes systemic risk at the European level.
3.2 Correlations of bank stock returns
De Nicolo and Kwast (2001) argue that estimation of the systemic risk potential may
be achieved using a measure of the interdependencies of financial institutions. For
an economic shock to become systemic a negative externality must exist, i.e. a
negative shock at a single bank must be highly likely to have contagious effects on
other financial institutions. Only if the financial institutions are interdependent in
some way such an externality exists – i.e. there is the threat of systemic risk. Such
interdependencies can be either direct, i.e. through direct exposures or indirect, i.e.
they arise from correlated exposures to non-financial sectors and financial markets.
De Nicolo and Kwast (2001) measure total interdependencies by the correlations of
stock returns of large and complex banking organisations (LCBOs).10 Since stock
prices reflect market participants’ collective evaluation of a firms prospects in the
future they also include the impact of the firms interdependencies with other
institutions.11 Consequently one can assume that an observed increase in correlations
among bank stock returns signals an increase in systemic risk potential. No change
in correlations or a decrease would therefore lead to the conclusion that the potential
of systemic risk has not increased or has declined.
There are several problems that limit the interpretation of correlations among bank
stock returns in regard to the potential for systemic risk:
                                          
10 In the United States LCBOs are identified by the Federal Reserve supervisors. For details see De
Nicolo and Kwast (2001: 4-5). To my knowledge such a classification does not exist for
Europe. Thus, we merely use the group of the largest European banks according to total assets.
11 A quite similar consideration was already made by Pozdena (1991) who regressed the stock
returns of various individual banks on each other in each period in order to get evidence for
contagious effect.
8 In general variations in correlations between returns can have manifold reasons
(see e.g., Goetzmann et al., 2001). For example, observed correlations can be
higher in periods of high stock return volatilities than when measured in periods
of low stock return volatilities even though the underlying correlation is constant
(Boyer et al., 1997). As a consequence, De Nicolo and Kwast (2001) estimate a
GARCH constant conditional correlation model (Bollerslev, 1990, Longin and
Solnik, 1995) with a time trend and test for the significance of the time trend as
an indication of an increase in interdependencies – and hence in the systemic risk
potential.
 The correlation structure may be sensitive to extreme events such as the October
1987 stock market crash. However, such one-time events will cause only a
temporary increase in correlations.
 An increase in the mean correlation in the European sample may be due to a
change in investors behaviour in the sense that with the introduction of the Euro
investors have started to operate Europe-wide in general. 
 An additional problem occurs when using correlations between bank stock
returns in an international context, since there are many national factors
determining the stock prices and hence the correlations. Thus, on the one hand,
high correlations may simply be due to the co-variation in national stock indices
or in fundamental economic variables such as interest rates and dividend yields.
On the other hand, different developments of national influences may cause
lower correlations between stock returns leading falsely to the conclusion that
interdependencies have decreased.12 Consequently, in an international context one
needs to control for national determinants of stock returns.
Despite these shortcomings and in consideration of the lack of appropriate data and
other analysis tools mentioned above, the analysis of correlations of bank stock
returns seems to be an appropriate tool for giving some indication concerning the
potential for systemic risk in European banking.
In a first step mean weekly rolling-window correlations of bank stock returns13 are
calculated for several samples without controlling for national factors. In a further
step a return generating model is estimated to control for national factors and
                                          
12 For example, the new law concerning capital profits in Germany will probably lead to a
temporary increase in the stock returns of German banks causing higher correlations between
German banks whereas at the same time correlations in the European sample will decline.
13 More precisely speaking, pairwise rolling-window correlations between weekly bank stock
returns are calculated and then for each weekly observation the mean is calculated over these
pairwise correlations.
9residuals are calculated that do not contain the part of stock returns that is due to
national influences. Rolling-window correlations among these adjusted bank stock
returns are then taken as a measure for the interdependencies and the systemic risk
potential.
This approach addresses most of the above listed problems. By comparing the
results for the banking sector to other industries the problem with investors
behaviour can to some extent be eliminated. Estimation of the return generating
model before calculating correlations eliminates national influences from bank stock
returns. Furthermore, this will partially control for events such as the 1987 stock
market crash.
3.3 Mean weekly rolling-window correlations of bank stock returns
To start with, correlations between bank pairs from 1980 to 2001 are calculated for a
European sample and several national sub-samples using a 52-week rolling
window.14 In this first step no adjustments are made concerning national
determinants of stock returns. The samples include the 60 largest European banks
according to total assets. For a list of the banks included in the sample see table A1
in the appendix.15 Thus for the “European” sample that includes all possible pairwise
combinations the mean weekly rolling-window correlation was calculated out of
1770 pairwise correlations. The “Europe cross-border only” sample includes only
correlations between banks of different countries which gives a number of 1545
pairwise combinations. The mean rolling-window correlations for these two samples
are shown in Figure 1a. Figure 1b shows mean rolling window correlations for six
national samples.
                                          
14 Weekly stock prices P are taken from Thomson Financial Datastream and returns R calculated
by subtracting the logarithmic stock prices, i.e. 1log( ) log( )t t tR P P  .
15 Note that not all bank stock series are available from 1980 on. For the starting dates of the series
see also table A1.
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Figure 1a – Mean rolling-window correlations of bank stock returns
 (52-week rolling window) – European samples
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Figure 1b  – Mean rolling-window correlations of bank stock returns
 (52-week rolling window) – national samples
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Figure 1b  – Mean rolling-window correlations of bank stock returns
 (52-week rolling window) – national samples – continued
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As can be seen from the figures, mean correlations vary heavily over time. Not
surprisingly, there are substantial increases in mean correlations in all samples in the
time following the stock market crash in 1987. Other peaks can be seen in the
beginning and the end of the 1990s which might be due to the Scandinavian banking
crisis and the near-failure of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management
(LTCM) in September 1998 following the Russian crisis, respectively.
The mean correlations in both European samples are substantially lower than in the
national samples, especially low are the correlations in the “Europe cross-border
only” sample. This is probably due to the fact that national factors determine to quite
an amount stock prices and hence returns.
For the European sample the average correlations clearly increase over time,
whereas for the national samples the average correlations don’t seem to change over
time – or in the case of Germany and Italy they even decrease over time. This
indicates increasing interdependencies among European banks and hence gives some
preliminary evidence that the potential for systemic risk in European banking may
have increased during the last two decades. 
Table 2 shows the means of average correlations for the different samples calculated
separately for the period before and after the introduction of the Euro.16
                                          
16 Note that in May 1998 the exchange rates between the EMU member countries were irrevocable
fixed. Thus, this date is taken as the starting date of the Euro, although the Euro was officially
introduced on January 1, 1999.
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Table 2 – Mean correlations of bank stock returns
Period Europe Europe
cross-
border
only
Germany Italy Spain Belgium Sweden United
Kingdom
1980:01 –
1998:04
0.1620 0.1104 0.7117 0.4074 0.5361 0.4178 0.6571 0.4259
1998:05 –
2001:11
0.2887 0.2406 0.5818 0.3652 0.4471 0.3893 0.5677 0.4663
For almost all national samples the mean correlation calculated over the EMU
period is lower or at least not higher than the mean correlation calculated over the
pre-EMU period. In contrast, the mean correlation of the European samples
increased substantially after the introduction of the Euro. This indicates that the Euro
and the accompanied financial market integration has led to an increase in
correlations among banks at the European level which may indicate an increase in
interdependencies among European banks. Possibly, as mentioned above, this
increase in correlations may simply be due to a change in investors behaviour.
However, looking at figure 1a shows that mean correlations increase over the whole
sample period and not just after 1999. In this context comparing the results for the
banking sector with other industries may provide additional insight.
Figure 2 shows mean rolling-window correlations between the leading European
firms in the consumer goods industry and the car industry, respectively.
Figure 2 – Mean rolling-window correlations of stock returns of other industry firms
 (52-week rolling window)
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Again, there are relatively high correlations directly after the stock market crash in
1987. Apart from that mean correlations are relatively low over the whole sample
period. In contrast to the European banking sample mean correlations do not
13
increase substantially over time – for the car industry at least not after the peak in
1987. 
Up to this point our analysis gives some preliminary evidence that interdependencies
among European banks have increased over the past years, and hence that systemic
risk potential in Europe has increased.
However, as mentioned above, there is an interpretation problem when correlations
are calculated between stock returns without controlling for national influences.
Since the aim is to measure systemic risk in a European context controlling for
national influences becomes necessary. Ignoring such influences could result, for
example, in increasing mean correlation over time that is simply due to increasing
correlations of the underlying national determinants of stock returns.
3.4 Further proceeding and methodology
In the following a two step approach is employed: First, to control for national
factors influencing stock returns a return generating model is estimated. The return
on the aggregate market portfolio and the unanticipated interest rate change are used
as determining factors. From these regressions, residuals are calculated that contain
the part of the returns that cannot be explained by national factors. Hence, these
residuals should contain the part of returns that is priced in due to international
influences.
Second, pairwise rolling-window correlations are calculated between these residuals
and the mean is calculated over all pairs as an indicator for the interdependencies
among European banks, and hence for the systemic risk potential in Europe.
The return generating model – eliminating national influences
Empirical research by, among others, Stone (1974), Flannery and James (1984a,b),
Aharony et al. (1986), Sweeney and Warga (1986), Yourougou (1990), Benink and
Wolff (2000) has shown that the inclusion of an interest rate factor adds substantial
explanatory power to the single-factor market model when explaining bank stock
returns. The interest rate variable is important for the valuation of stocks of financial
institutions because the accounting returns and costs of financial institutions are
directly dependent on interest rates.17 The interest rate sensitivity depends on the
characteristics of the bank’s asset and liability positions. In the literature the
following two-factor return generating model is usually estimated:
                                          
17 An additional argument in favour of the inclusion of the interest rate variable is that within EMU
the convergence – and after the introduction of the Euro the equality – of money market rates
would lead to an increase in the correlations of unadjusted stock returns.
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.it oi mi t Ii t itR MR UI       (1)
Where itR  is the rate of return on the stock of bank i at time t, tMR  is the rate of
market return, tUI  the unexpected change in interest rate levels, and it  the error
term.
The unexpected change in interest rates serves as the second factor in the model
since in efficient financial markets, the expected value of the relevant interest
variable will have already been reflected in asset values and returns. Hence, only the
unexpected component should have an effect on asset returns (Choi et al., 1992).
The forecasting error from an ARIMA model is used as the unexpected change in
interest rate.
The aim of the estimation of the return generating model in the context of this paper
is to exclude all national influences on bank stock returns that may limit
interpretation of the following correlation analysis. If the model is estimated
according to (1), i.e. bank stock returns are regressed on a respective national stock
market index and a national interest rate, European influences that effect national
indexes are also excluded. However, such influences, for example, common shocks,
may cause systemic risk at the European level. The residuals from equation (1) do
not contain such European influences.
Therefore the following  adjustment to the above two-factor model are made.
Equation (1) is extended by the return of a European index (European market return:
EMR). Thus, the following return generating model is estimated:
.it oi mi t ei t Ii t itR MR EMR UI         (2)
As a consequence, the coefficient ei  represents the influence of the European
market on the individual bank stock return and therefore this influence is excluded
from the national market return.18
The part of the bank stock return that is not due to national influence is calculated as
~
it it oi mi t Ii tR R MR UI      (3)
                                          
18 Clearly, there exists multicollinearity between the regressors tMR  and tEMR . However, this only
limits hypothesis testing but does not influence our proceeding since we are only interested in
eliminating national influences from stock returns.
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In a following step pairwise rolling-window correlations between these residuals 
~
itR
are calculated as a measure for the interdependencies among European banks, and
hence as an indication for the potential of systemic risk in Europe.
The data
For a list of the banks included in the sample see table A1 in the appendix.
Unfortunately, for Greece and Denmark interest rate data and data on market returns
were incomplete. Thus, banks from these countries were dropped from the sample of
the 60 largest European banks. This reduces the sample size to 54 banks from the
countries Germany, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Austria, Belgium,
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, and the United Kingdom.
Bank stock prices are taken from Thomson Financial Datastream – more precisely
the return indexes are used that show a theoretical growth in value of a share
holding, assuming that dividends are re-invested to purchase additional units of an
equity. Returns itR  are then calculated as the logarithmic differences between two
values of the return index.
National market returns tMR  are calculated using the MSCI National Stock Indexes
that can be downloaded from the MSCI webpage. The European index tEMR  is also
taken from the MSCI database. All indexes used are performance indexes, i.e. their
calculation corresponds with the return indexes taken for the bank stocks. The
unanticipated change in interest rates tUI  is calculated using the money market rate
taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
In contrast to the correlation analysis in section 3.3 monthly data is used since the
MSCI National Stock Indexes are only available on a monthly basis for longer
periods. The sample period is between January 1980 and July 2001.
3.5 Estimation
Estimation of unanticipated changes in interest rates
In order to generate the monthly observations of unexpected changes in the  interest
rate tUI  for every country an ARIMA(p,1,q) methodology of the general form
( ) ( )t tB I B z    (4)
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is used. Where tI  represents the first difference of the money market interest rate
series tI  and tz  is a shock term.19 B is the back-shift operator and ( )B  and ( )B
represent the autoregressive (AR) and moving average (MA) components,
respectively. 
The particular orders p and q of the AR and MA components, respectively, were
chosen according to the minimum Schwarz-criterion. The particular ARIMA models
estimated for every country with the respective estimation results are shown in table
A2 in the appendix.
The unexpected component of the interest rates is determined by subtracting the
predicted values in equation (4) from the actual values. Hence,
( )t t tUI I E I  (5)
where ( )tE I  is the expected interest rate, predicted by the ARIMA model.
Estimation of the return generating model
Since for most of the countries there is more than one bank in the sample estimation
of equation (2) can be accomplished in different ways. Obviously, a single equation
framework would disregard the fact that bank stock returns are interrelated. On the
European level these interdependencies contribute to the systemic risk potential that
is assessed by calculating rolling-window correlations. To control for these
interdependencies in the estimation procedure would therefore not be appropriate in
the context of this paper. However, it should be controlled for such
interdependencies among banks within one country. Thus, for every country
equation (2) is estimated in a panel with fixed effects using least squares.20 The
estimation results for these regressions are shown in table 3.
                                          
19 Unit root tests indicated that all money market rates are I(1) series.
20 As a consequence, there is a fixed effect coefficient oi  estimated for every bank (which is not
reported in table 3) and one coefficient on the national market return, the European market
return and the interest rate change for every country, respectively. Note that estimation was
done with the computer package Eviews, that computes the fixed effects by subtracting the
“within” mean from each variable and estimating OLS using the transformed data.
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Table 3 – Estimation results of the return generating model for every country
Country Number of
banks
included in
the panel
mi ei Ii
2.adj R DW
Germany 4 1.002
(23.094)**
0.068
(1.241)
-0.002
(-0.367)
0.59 2.12
France 2 1.148
(7.319)**
0.001
(0.004)
0.010
(1.062)
0.48 2.06
The
Netherlands
1 1.322
(6.469)**
-0.037
(-0.181)
0.000
(0.016)
0.58 2.23
Spain 4 0.904
(16.874)**
0.097
(1.282)
0.003
(0.908)
0.55 2.21
Italy 18 0.677
(26.243)**
0.142
(3.613)**
0.022
(7.609)**
0.33 2.04
Ireland 2 0.920
(11.949)**
0.127
(1.300)
0.000
(0.057)
0.48 2.06
Austria 1 0.759
(4.006)**
0.052
(0.225)
-0.039
(-0.665)
0.36 2.05
Belgium 3 0.908
(17.267)**
0.004
(0.067)
-0.005
(-1.964)
0.49 2.24
Portugal 2 0.774
(11.057)**
-0.016
(-0.160)
-0.002
(-0.453)
0.41 2.16
Sweden 4 0.598
(7.728)**
0.226
(1.779)
-0.003
(-3.654)**
0.25 1.81
Switzerland 2 1.043
(13.259)**
0.241
(2.830)**
0.000
(0.117)
0.53 2.17
Norway 2 0.467
(3.188)**
0.078
(0.370)
-0.039
(-5.313)**
0.25 1.98
United
Kingdom
9 0.681
(7.671)**
0.309
(3.120)
-0.001
(-0.310)
0.28 1.98
Fixed effects panel estimation of the model it oi mi t ei t Ii t itR MR EMR UI         using least
squares. The fixed effect coefficients oi  are not reported. t-statistics are indicated between
parentheses. One (two) asterisk(s) indicate significance at the 0.05 (0.01) level.
As expected the coefficient on the national market return mi  is highly significant for
every country. It usually lies between 0.6 and 1.0 which indicates a moderate impact
on the return of the respective national market index on bank stock returns. The
coefficient associated with the interest rate change Ii  is insignificant in most of the
cases. Only for Italy, Sweden and Norway Ii  is significantly different from zero.
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This is partly in line with former research that found for the US decreasing interest
rate sensitivity of bank stock returns in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Choi and
Elyasiani, 1996, Benink and Wolff, 2000). 
The coefficient on the European market return is – with the exception of Italy and
Switzerland – insignificant for all countries. However, since our aim is not to
explain bank stock returns but rather to eliminate all national influences the
insignificance of this coefficient is not decisive.21 Also, adjusted R-squares are
relatively low compared to multi-factor-model regressions in the literature (Flannery
and James, 1984a, 1984b, Sweeney and Warga, 1986, Yourougou, 1990, Saunders
and Yourougou, 1990). Again, with respect to the aim of the regressions this is
irrelevant.
In a further step the estimation results of the return generating model are used to
calculate the part of the bank stock returns 
~
itR  that could not be explained by
national factors (see equation (3) above).
3.6 New Evidence for systemic risk potential in Europe – Correlation
results
In the second step of the analysis, rolling-window correlations between the adjusted
stock returns 
~
itR  of the 54 European banks are calculated over the whole sample
period from March 1980 to July 2001.22 A 12-month backward looking window is
used. From these 1431 pairwise rolling-window correlations the mean is calculated
as an indication for the development of the interdependencies among European
banks, and hence of the potential for systemic risk in European banking. Figure 3a
shows this mean rolling-window correlation for the whole sample of 54 banks.
Figure 3b shows the mean of all pairwise rolling-window correlations between
banks of different countries, i.e. the mean cross-border correlation.23 Unfortunately,
prior to 1986 bank stock return data is relatively scarce. As a consequence, the mean
correlation is dominated by a few outliers, which leads to some peaks that cannot be
explained by economic reasoning. Thus, we report in figures 3a and 3b mean
rolling-window correlations for the time after 1986.
                                          
21 Note that low t-statistics may also be a result of the multicollinearity between tMR  and tEMR  that
can cause high variances of the OLS estimates.
22 Some data at the beginning of the sample period are lost due to the ARIMA estimations.
23 In this “cross-border only”-case the mean correlation is calculated on the basis of 1216 pairwise
rolling-window correlations.
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Figure 3a – Mean 12-month-rolling-window correlations of European bank stock returns after
controlling for national factors – whole sample of 54 banks
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Figure 3b – Mean 12-month-rolling-window correlations of European bank stock returns after
controlling for national factors – only cross-border correlations included
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02
Cross border only
20
After controlling for national factors mean correlations vary less heavily over time.
Not surprisingly, correlations in the sample where only cross-border correlations are
taken into account (figure 3b) are smaller than in the sample with all pairwise
correlations. As expected, the increase in mean correlation in response to the stock
market crash in 1987 is less pronounced, since the respective national market return
in the return generating model controls for this event.
The temporary increases in mean correlations in the early 1990s are probably due to
banking crisis in some European countries: Norway 1987-93, Sweden 1990-93,
Finland 1991-94 and Italy 1990-94 (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). These
peaks are less pronounced in the “cross-border only”-sample which shows that the
increases are mainly due to high correlations between stock returns of banks within
one country. This indicates that at the beginning of the 1990s the threat of contagion
across countries was relatively moderate.
A substantial increase in mean correlations can be observed around 1999. This is
probably a result of the near-failure of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM) in September 1998 that followed the Russian crisis. This peak
is also considerable in the “cross-border only”-sample which indicates that in the
late 1990s the threat of contagion across countries existed to a greater amount than
at the beginning of the 1990s.
Overall there is evidence that mean correlations have increased in the past 15 years.
Table 4 shows the results of a simple least squares regression of the mean
correlations on a constant and a time trend. 
Table 4 – Regressions of mean correlations on a constant and a time trend
Sample Number of
pairwise
combinations
Sample period Intercept Time trend
Whole sample 1431 1986:01 –
2001:07
0.0236
(3.185)**
0.0004
(8.462)**
Cross border
correlations only
1216 1986:01 –
2001:07
-0.0732
 (-9.829)**
0.0007
(15.467)**
t-statistics are indicated between parentheses. One (two) asterisk(s) indicate
significance at the 0.05 (0.01) level.
For both samples the coefficient associated with the time trend is highly significant.
For the sample where the mean was calculated from cross-border correlations only,
the time trend coefficient is even higher than for the sample where correlations
between banks of the same country where also taken into account.
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In summary this analysis provides some evidence that interdependencies among
European banks of different countries have become stronger within the past 15
years. Thus, the potential for systemic risk in banking has increased at the European
level.
However, absolute mean correlations among stock returns of European banks from
different countries still are relatively low compared with correlations in the national
samples (see figure 1b). At the European level (figure 3b) mean correlations range
from a low of -0.068 to a high of 0.194 with a mean of 0.035. For the national
samples mean correlations often reach values of up to 0.7 or even as high as 0.9.
This indicates that the threat of systemic risk is still higher at a national level than at
the European level. Unfortunately, we cannot make a more exact statement
concerning the absolute threat of systemic risk at the European level compared to the
national level. Nevertheless, the analysis above provides evidence that the potential
for systemic risk in European banking has increased within the past 15 years. This
indicates that at least to some extent a shift of systemic risk from the national level
to the European level has occurred.
4 Conclusion
The analysis in this paper attempts to answer the question whether the threat of
systemic risk in banking is a national threat or rather a Europe-wide threat.
Following De Nicolo and Kwast (2001), mean rolling-window correlations between
bank stock returns are used as a measure for the interdependencies among European
banks, and hence for the systemic risk potential in Europe. At first, weekly rolling-
window correlations are calculated between bank stock returns without controlling
for national factors. These give evidence that interdependencies have increased
within the last two decades. However, since national factors determine to a large
extent stock returns this result can only be seen as preliminary.
Thus, in the second part of the analysis we estimate a return generating model in
order to eliminate national influences from bank stock returns. Thereafter, rolling-
window correlations are calculated using the adjusted bank stock returns. Again, we
find evidence that interdependencies among European banks have increased over the
last 15 years. This indicates that there has been a shift in the systemic risk potential
from a national level to a European level.
However, there are several caveats of our study. Mainly, there are a number of
shortcomings of the correlation approach that limit interpretation. Furthermore, no
direct comparison can be made between the potential of systemic risk at the national
level and the European level. The analysis allows merely for statements concerning
the development of the threat of systemic risk over time. Nevertheless, recalling the
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lack of empirical studies in particular for Europe and the lack of data available on
interbank lending at an international level the analysis in this paper is appropriate.
The evidence on the rise in systemic risk potential found for Europe provides an
argument in favour of Europe-wide banking regulation and supervision. Whether the
existing forms of cooperation between the national authorities is an appropriate way
in securing financial stability or whether a single European supervisor is needed is
up to further research.
References
Aharony, J., A. Saunders and I. Swary (1986), The Effects of a Shift in Monetary
Policy Regime on the Profitability and Risk of Commercial Banks, Journal
of Monetary Economics 17, 363-377.
Aharony, J. and I. Swary (1983), Contagion Effects of Bank Failures: Evidence from
Capital Markets, Journal of Business 56 (3), 305-322.
Akhigbe, A. and J. Madura (2001), Why do contagion effects vary among bank
failures?, Journal of Banking & Finance 25, 657-680.
Angelini, P., G. Maresca and d. Russo (1996), Systemic risk in the netting system,
Journal of Banking & Finance 20, 853-868.
Bartholomew, P. F. and G. W. Whalen (1995), Fundamentals of systemic Risk, in
Kaufman, G. (ed.), Banking, Financial Markets, and Systemic Risk,
Greenwich, 3-18.
Benink, H. and C. Wolff (2000), Survey data and the interest rate sensitivity of US
bank stock returns, Economic Notes 29 (2), 201-213.
Bessler, W. and T. Nohel (2000), Asymmetric information, dividend reductions, and
contagion effects in bank stock returns, Journal of Banking & Finance 24,
1831-1848.
Bollerslev, T. (1990), Modelling the Coherence in Short-Run Nominal Exchange
Rates: A Multivariate Generalized Arch Model, The Review of Economics
and Statistics 72 (3), 498-505.
Boyer B. H., M. S. Gibson and M. Loretan (1999), Pitfalls in Tests for Changes in
Correlations, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
International Finance Discussion Papers No. 597, Washington DC.
Canoy, M., M. van Dijk, J. Lemmen, R. de Mooij and J. Weigand (2001),
Competition and Stability in Banking, CPB Document No 015, The Hague.
23
Choi, J. J. and E. Eyasiani (1996), Derivate Exposure and the Interest Rate and
Exchange Rate Risks of U.S. Banks, University of Pennsylvania Working
Paper No. 96-53, Pennsylvania.
Choi, J. J., E. Eyasiani and K. J. Kopecky (1992), The sensitivity of bank stock
returns to market, interest and exchange rate risks, Temple University,
Philadelphia.
Davis, E. P. (1992), Debt, Financial Fragility, and systematic Risk, Oxford.
De Bandt, O. and P. Hartmann (2000), Systematic Risk: A Survey, ECB Working
Paper No. 35, Frankfurt.
De Nicolo, G. and M. L. Kwast (2001), Systemic Risk and Financial Consolidation:
Are they related?, The Federal Reserve Board Financial and Economic
Diskussion Paper No. 33, Washington DC.
Demirgüc-Kunt, A. and E. Detragiache (1998), The Determinants of Banking Crises
in Developing and Developed Countries, IMS Staff Papers 45 (1).
Diamond, D. W. and P. H. Dybvig (1983), Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 91(3).
Dornbusch, R., Y. C. Park and S. Claessenes (2000) Contagion: How it spreads and
how it can be stopped, Forthcoming World Bank Research Observer 2000.
Flannery, M. J. and C. M. James (1984a), The Effect of Interest Rate Changes on the
Common Stock Returns of Financial Institutions, The Journal of Finance 39
(4), 1141-1153.
Flannery, M. J. and C. M. James (1984b), Market Evidence on the Effective
Maturity of Bank Assets and Liabilities, Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking 16 (4.1), 435-445.
Furfine, C. H. (1999), Interbank Exposures: Quantifying the Risk of Contagion, BIS
Working Paper No. 70.
Goodhart, C., P. Hartmann, D. Llewellyn, L. Rojas-Suárez and S. Weisbrod (1998),
Financial Regulation: Why, how and where now?, London.
Goetzmann, W. N., L. Li and K. G. Rouwenhorst (2001), Long-Term Global Market
Correlations, Yale School of Management Paper, New Haven.
Humphrey, D. B. (1986), Payments Finality and Risk of Settlement Failures, in
Saunders, A. and L. White (eds.), Technology, and the Regulation of
Financial Markets; Securities, Futures, and Banking, Lexington, 97-120. 
Kaufmann, G. G. (1994), Bank Contagion: A Review of the Theory and Evidence,
Journal of Financial Services Research 17 , 123-150.
Kaufmann, G.G. (1995), Comments on Systemic Risk, in Kaufman, G. (ed.),
Banking, Financial Markets, and Systemic Risk, Greenwich, 47-54.
24
Kaufmann, G. G. (1996), Bank Failures, Systematic Risk, and Bank Regulation, The
Cato Journal 16 (1).
Kaufmann, G. G. and K.E. Scott, (2000), Does Bank Regulation Retard or
Contribute to Systemic Risk?, Stanford Law School Working Paper No. 211,
Stanford.
Longin, F. and B. Solnik (1995), Is the correlation in international equity returns
constant: 1960-1990? Journal of International Money and Finance14 (1), 3-
26.
Michael, I. (1998), Financial Interlinkages and Systemic Risk, Financial Stability
Review 4, Spring, 26-33.
Pozdena (1991), Is Banking Really Prone to Panics?, FRBSF Weekly Letter No. 91-
35.
Saunders, A. and P. Yourougou (1990), Are Banks Special? The Separation of
Banking from Commerce and Interest Rate Risk,  Journal of Economics and
Business 42, 171-182.
Schoenmaker, D. (1996), Contagion Risk in Banking, L.S.E. Financial Markets
Group Diskussion Paper, No. 239, London.
Sheldon G. And M. Maurer (1998), Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk: An
Empirical Analysis for Switzerland, Swiss Journal of Economics and
Statistics 134 (4.2), 685-704.
Slovin M. B., M. E. Sushka and J. A. Polonchek (1999), An analysis of contagion
and competitive effects at commercial banks, Journal of Financial
Economics 54, 197-225.
Staub, M. (1999), Aspects of Systematic Risk in Banking: Inter Bank Loans, Optimal
Bank Size and the Swiss Regional Bank Crisis, Basel.
Stone, B. K. (1974), Systematic Interest Rate Risk in a Two-Index Model of
Returns, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 9 (5), 709-722.
Swary, I. (1986), Stock Market Reaction to Regulatory Action in the Continental
Illinois Crisis, Journal of Business 59 (3), 451-473.
Sweeney, R. J. and A. D. Warga (1986), The Pricing of Interest-Rate Risk: Evidence
from the Stock Market, The Journal of Finance 41 (2), 393-410.
Yourougou, P. (1990), Interest-Rate Risk and the Pricing of Depository Financial
Intermediary Common Stock, Journal of Banking and Finance 14, 803-820.
25
Appendix
Table A1 – Banks included in the samples
Name of the bank Country Data available
since
1 Deutsche Bank Germany 01/1980
2 HypoVereinsbank Germany 01/1980
3 Dresdner Bank Germany 01/1980
4 Commerzbank Germany 01/1980
5 BNP Paribas France 10/1993
6 Societé Générale France 07/1987
7 ABN Amro The Netherlands 09/1990
8 BSCH Santander Spain 03/1987
9 BBV Argent.. Spain 03/1988
10 Banco Popular Spain 03/1987
11 Bankinter Spain 03/1987
12 Intesa BCI Italy 01/1980
13 Unicredito Italiano Italy 01/1980
14 San Paolo IMI Italy 04/1992
15 Banca di Roma Italy 01/1980
16 Monte die Paschi di Siena Italy 06/1999
17 Banca Nazionale del Lavro Italy 09/1998
18 Rolo Banca Italy 02/1992
19 BIPOP- Carire Italy 01/1986
20 Banca Popular di Verona Italy 06/1998
21 Banca Popular di Bergamo Italy 01/1986
22 Banca Popular di Milano Italy 01/1986
23 Banca Lombarda Italy 01/1986
24 Banca Popular di Lodi Italy 01/1986
25 Banca Popular di Novara Italy 01/1986
26 Banca Popular dell Emilia Rom. Italy 12/1991
27 Banca Fideuram Italy 01/1987
28 Banca Pop. Com. e Industr. Italy 01/1986
29 Banca Popular di Sondrio Italy 08/1995
30 Bank of Ireland Ireland 01/1980
Note: Included are the 60 largest European banks according to total assets in
1999. Source: www.manager-magazin.de. Sorted by country.
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Table A1 – Banks included in the samples – continued
Name of the bank Country Data available
since
31 Allied Irish Banks Ireland 01/1980
32 Erste Bank Austria 12/1997
33 Almanij Belgium 01/1980
34 Dexia Belgium 11/1996
35 KBC Belgium 01/1980
36 Banco Comercial Portuges Portugal 01/1988
37 Banco Esprito Santo Portugal 10/1992
38 Nordea Sweden 12/1997
39 SEB Sweden 01/1982
40 Svenska Handelsbanken Sweden 01/1982
41 Föreningssparbanken Sweden 06/1995
42 UBS Switzerland 01/1980
43 Julius Bär Switzerland 10/1980
44 Den Norske Bank (DNB Hldg) Norway 09/1992
45 Spardebanken Nord-Norge Norway 09/1995
46 HSBC United Kingdom 07/1992
47 Royal Bank of Scotland United Kingdom 01/1980
48 Barclays Bank United Kingdom 01/1980
49 HBOS (Halifax & Bank of
Scotland)
United Kingdom 05/1997
50 Abbey National United Kingdom 07/1989
51 Standard Chartered United Kingdom 01/1980
52 Alliance & Leicester United Kingdom 04/1997
53 Northern Rock United Kingdom 09/1997
54 Lloyds TSB United Kingdom 12/1995
55 Den Danske Bank Denmark 01/1980
56 National Bank of Greece Greece 01/1988
57 EFG Eurobank Greece 01/1988
58 Commercial Bank of Greece Greece 01/1988
59 Bank of Piraeus Greece 04/1988
60 Alpha Bank Greece 01/1988
Note: Included are the 60 largest European banks according to total assets in
1999. Source: www.manager-magazin.de. Sorted by country.
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Table A2 – Estimation results of the ARIMA(p,1,q) models for the national interest rates
AR components MA components
Country 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3
Germany -0.025
(0.025)
1.292
(0.072)**
-0.698
(0.063)**
-1.162
(0.091)**
0.625
(0.107)**
0.170
(0.070)**
France -0.041
(0.044)
-1.007
(0.020)**
-0.935
(0.019)**
1.275
(0.067)**
1.181
(0.075)**
0.171
(0.065)**
The Netherlands -0.027
(0.029)
-0.144
(0.126)
-0.440
(0.111)**
0.145
(0.136)
0.598
(0.102)**
0.220
(0.070)**
Spain -0.040
(0.057)
0.769
(0.062)**
-0.953
(0.075)**
-0085
(0.096)
-0.035
(0.073)
-0.119
(0.058)**
-0.988
(0.015)**
Italy -0.054
(0.039)
0.188
(0.061)**
Ireland -0.045
(0.014)**
0.471
(0.108)**
0.338
(0.124)**
-0.179
(0.092)
-0.036
(0.090)
-1.162
(0.097)**
0.727
(0.153)**
-0.611
(0.092)**
Austria -0.033
(0.028)
-0.126
(0.287)
-0.443
(0.237)
0.650
(0.268)*
-0.010
(0.061)
0.086
(0.060)
0.076
(0.281)
0.470
(0.216)*
-0.684
(0.285)*
Belgium -0.033
(0.027)
1.595
(0.174)**
-1.104
(0.247)**
0.397
(0.134)**
-0.256
(0.072)**
-1.981
(0.181)**
1.427
(0.312)**
-0.250
(0.179)
Portugal -0.050
(0.032)
-0.129
(0.060)*
-0.255
(0.060)**
Estimation of the ARIMA(p,1,q) model 2 3 4 5 2 31 2 3 4 5 1 2 3(1 ) (1 )t tB B B B B I B B B z                   .Where tI represents the differencing of
the money market interest rate series tI , and tz  is a shock term. B is the back-shift operator and ( )B  and ( )B  represent the autoregressive
(AR) and moving average (MA) components, respectively. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. One (two) asterisk(s) indicates significance at
the 0.05 (0.01) level. Cells left blank indicate that the respective AR and/or MA component was not part of the model that was selected according
to the minimum Schwarz-criterion.
28
Table A2 – Estimation results of the ARIMA(p,1,q) models for the national interest rates – continued
AR components MA components
Country 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3
Sweden -0.034
(0.042)
-0.862
(0.031)**
Switzerland -0.006
(0.034)
-2.084
(0.083)**
-1.589
(0.136)**
-0.476
(0.065)**
1.774
(0.085)**
0.796
(0.131)**
-0.019
(0.055)
Norway 0.013
(0.055)
0.092
(0.058)
-0.948
(0.057)**
-0.261
(0.051)**
-0.233
(0.054)**
-0.535
(0.037)**
1.078
(0.037)**
United Kingdom -0.030
(0.011)**
0.028
(0.094)
-0.068
(0.066)
0.724
(0.056)**
0.142
(0.061)*
-0.198
(0.072)**
0.024
(0.071)
-0.816
(0.064)**
Estimation of the ARIMA(p,1,q) model 2 3 4 5 2 31 2 3 4 5 1 2 3(1 ) (1 )t tB B B B B I B B B z                   .Where tI represents the differencing of
the money market interest rate series tI , and tz  is a shock term. B is the back-shift operator and ( )B  and ( )B  represent the autoregressive
(AR) and moving average (MA) components, respectively. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. One (two) asterisk(s) indicates significance at
the 0.05 (0.01) level. Cells left blank indicate that the respective AR and/or MA component was not part of the model that was selected according
to the minimum Schwarz-criterion.
